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The cpntract is a lengthy one, intended to resolve all po-
tential disputes between the parties; substantial legal research
and negotiation preceded its drafting. Detailed requirements
explicitly set out the manner in which the agreement must be
performed, while other clauses provide for insurance coverage
to guarantee the payment of the contract price should the
party to receive performance predecease the contract's com-
pletion. The party to receive performance also agrees to as-
sume responsibility for the contract's subject matter regard-
less of its quality. Indeed, this contract might be any complex
commercial negotiation except that it is one for surrogate ges-
tation, and the subject matter to be conveyed is a child.
In a surrogate gestation contract, persons unable to con-
ceive children contract with a woman capable of conception.'
The parties agree that the surrogate gestator will be artifi-
cially inseminated,' will carry the resulting pregnancy to term,
© 1982 by M. Louise Graham
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1. Estimates indicate that one out of every five married couples is infertile.
Sixty percent of those cases are due to female infertility. Taylor-Fleming, New Fron-
tiers in Conception, N.Y. Times, July 20, 1980 (Magazine), at 20. See generally, S.J.
KLEEGMAN AND S.A. KAUFMAN, INFERTILrrY IN WOMEN (1966) (discussing the causes of
infertility in women).
2. In all publicized contracts, the surrogate has been artificially inseminated by
the prospective adoptive father. The contract has provided for the transfer of the
child to this biological father and his spouse. Brief for Plaintiff at 2, Commonwealth
v. Surrogate Parenting Assocs., No. 81-CI-0121 (Ken., Franklin Cir. Ct. Div. I, filed
Jan. 27, 1981) [hereinafter cited as Surrogate Parenting Brief]; Letter from Katie M.
Brophy, founder of Surrogate Parenting Associates to Louise Graham (April 29, 1980)
(on file in the author's office) [hereinafter cited as Brophy]. Surrogate gestation need
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and then will terminate her parental rights in order to permit
adoption of the child by those persons who contracted for her
services. Because surrogate gestation contracts are perceived
as having questionable legality, some participants are reluc-
tant to reveal their identities. Some instances of surrogate ge-
station, however, have resulted in widespread publicity. The
best known contracts involve adoptive parents and surrogate
gestators matched by physicians and attorneys.'
Statements from participants indicate that although per-
sonal motivations for entering into the arrangement vary, pro-
spective adoptive parents often are impelled, not only by their
disappointment with the lengthy adoption process, but also by
a particular desire to have a child who is biologically related
to its father.4 One surrogate provider service reports that it
not, however, be limited to artificial insemination by the husband in a married couple
seeking an alternative means of conceiving a child. There is some evidence that a
growing number of single women are using artificial insemination; surrogate gestation
might be subject to similar demands. Taylor-Fleming, supra note 1.
3. Two such providers of surrogate services are Surrogate Parenting Associates
of Louisville, Kentucky and Michigan attorney Noel Keane. Surrogate Parenting As-
sociates was formed by Katie M. Brophy and Dr. Richard Levin. Levin and Brophy
located their first surrogate gestator through an advertisement in a Louisville newspa-
per. Levin now uses computers to match clients and potential surrogates. Keane has
coordinated a number of surrogate transactions. Currently he is challenging Michigan
adoption laws preventing payment for those transactions. Taylor-Fleming, supra note
1, at 22; Both services have received national media attention. Pregnancy by Proxy,
Newsweek, July 7, 1980, at 72 [hereinafter cited as Proxy]. Physicians have histori-
cally exercised substantial control over the selection of artificial insemination donors
and recipients. W. FINEGOLD, ARTIvIcIAL INSEMINATION 5-8 (1976). At one time physi-
cians required that the husband select the donor in order to avoid liability for poor
selection. That procedure was abandoned because of fear that a relationship might
develop between a donor and the inseminated wife. Id. A recent study indicates that
sixty-two percent of current donors are medical students. Annas, Fathers Anony-
mous: Beyond the Best Interests of the Sperm Donor, 14 FAM. L. Q. 1, 6 (1980).
Since artificial insemination requires only standard hospital consent forms, attorneys
have not been extensively involved in form preparation. The entrance of attorneys
into the field is a result of the need to control, not only the doctor-patient relation-
ship, but that of contract participants. Attorneys who have entered the field have
aided both in contract drafting and in establishing surrogate-adoptive parent rela-
tionships. Taylor-Fleming, supra note 1, at 22. An attorney who advertises for a sur-
rogate gestator to further the interests of clients unable to bear children has not nec-
essarily advertised his or her legal services. Placing the client's advertisement should
be distinguished from those cases in which an attorney offers to represent parties
interested in surrogate gestation. Such advertisements could pose interpretive
problems under Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
4. The time lapse between application and initiation of the adoption procedure
can be as long as six years when the adoptive parents desire an infant. L. WISHARD &
W.R. WISHARD, ADOPTION: THE GRAFTED TREE 48 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
WISHARD]. Additionally, most states require a six month to one year waiting period
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accepts only married couples as prospective adoptive parents
and uses as surrogates only married women who have already
born children.5 Such limitations may be designed to bolster
the image of surrogate gestation as an acceptable practice.
First, married couples provide the traditionally preferred two-
parent families;6 and second, the use of married mothers as
surrogates avoids the stigma of inducing unwed women to be-
come mothers as well as ensures that the surrogates have past
experience with their task.'
Once the would-be parents decide to enter into a surro-
gate gestation contract, they are matched with a surrogate
who, like them, has undergone extensive psychological 8 and
physical testing. For example, surrogates and prospective
adoptive parents matched by provider services are routinely
checked for genetic compatibility, including the ability of the
surrogate to provide traits desired by the parents-to-be.' The
before the adoption becomes final. M.I. LEVY & R.D. WIENBERG, LAW OF ADO PION 51-
63 (4th ed. 1979). Surrogate gestation thus offers an alternative to a lengthy proce-
dure. The practice may also offer an alternative to some persons who might not oth-
erwise qualify under agency standards related to age. Many agencies restrict infant
adoptions by parents over forty. WISHARD, supra, at 46. For some persons, however,
the most marked advantage to surrogate gestation is the biological relationship be-
tween the father and the child. That relationship may ensure more than a general
physical similarity. It also promises intellectual similarity and fulfills a psychological
need to be a parent. Cf. W. FINEGOLD, supra note 3, at 22-23 (The advantages of
artificial insemination include avoidance of poor genetic background in adoptable
children, similar physical appearance, and satisfaction of women's "craving for carry-
ing with child.").
5. Cassidy, Brave New Child, Bluegrass Woman, Oct.-Nov. 1980, at 24.
6. Limitations in surrogate gestation contracts providing that the recipients of
the child must be a married couple comport with preferences exercised by most adop-
tion agencies. See J. McNAMARA, THs ADoPTION ADVISOR 21 (1975); WISHARD, Supra
note 4, at 41.
7. Using married mothers as surrogates protects both the surrogate and the
physician or attorney who facilitates the surrogate gestation transaction. Providers of
surrogate gestation services reason that women with other children will better under-
stand the psychological problems potentially present in surrendering the child. Tay-
lor-Fleming, supra note 1, at 24. Experience with the task may also have an effect on
the surrogate's assumption of the medical risks inherent in pregnancy.
8. Psychiatric evaluation of all parties is required in the contracts of Surrogate
Parenting Associates of Louisville, Kentucky. Brophy, supra note 2.
9. One set of prospective parents requested a surrogate whose genetic make-up
would, possibly produce a child slightly taller than either parent. Cassidy, supra note
5, at 24. At the opposite pole, physicians who facilitate surrogate gestation contracts
could also be liable for their failure to detect genetic incompatibility. Outside of the
surrogate gestation context such liability is expanding. See, e.g., Gildiner v. Thomas
Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 451 F. Supp. 692 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (Tay-Sachs disease); Berman
v. Allen, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979) (Down's syndrome); Becker v. Schwartz, 60
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surrogate, represented by her own attorney,10 then contracts
with the prospective adoptive parents, represented by their
attorney, that the surrogate will be artificially inseminated
with the adoptive parent-husband's sperm, will carry any re-
sulting pregnancy to culmination, and finally terminate her
parental rights1" to permit adoption by the biological father
and his spouse.'
App. Div. 2d 587, 400 N.Y.S.2d 119 (1977), modified, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807,
413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978) (Down's syndrome). The standard of care applicable to phy-
sicians who routinely use genetic screening as a part of surrogate gestation should be
higher than that applied to ordinary physicians. Facilitators of surrogate gestation
contracts might be found to be genetic counselors and, thus, subject to a higher stan-
dard of care. See generally Capron, Tort Liability in Genetic Counseling, 79 COL. L.
REV. 618 (1979); Reilly, Genetic Counseling and the Law, 12 Hous. L. REV. 640
(1975); Walz & Thigpen, Genetic Screening and Counseling: The Legal and Ethical
Issues, 68 Nw. U.L. REV. 696 (1973); Note, Father and Mother Know Best: Defining
the Liability of Physicians for Inadequate Genetic Counseling, 87 YALE L.J. 1488
(1978).
10. Since the interests of the surrogate gestator and those of the adoptive par-
ents may conflict at some point, the same attorney has difficulty representing the
prospective adoptive parents and the surrogate. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPON-
SIBILiTY DR 5-105(A)-(C).
11. In the contracts drafted by Surrogate Parenting Associates of Louisville,
Kentucky, both the surrogate gestator and her husband contractually agree not to
form a parent-child relationship with any child conceived pursuant to the agreement
and to terminate their parental rights to such a child. Surrogate Parenting Brief,
supra note 2, app. at 3. In Kentucky parental rights may not be voluntarily termi-
nated prior to five days after the child's birth. Ky. REV. STAT. § 199.601 (1978). At
least one other state has a similar waiting period. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 1511
(Smith-Hurd 1980) (No consent or surrender shall be taken within the seventy-two
hour period following the birth). The surrogate and her husband also agree to permit
the biological father's name to be listed on the birth certificate. See Ky. REV. STAT. §
213.050 (1972) (providing for the use of a natural father's name on the birth certifi-
cate when an affadavit is filed stating that the affiant is the father of the child).
Finally the surrogate's husband agrees to undergo paternity testing to rebut any pre-
sumption of paternity. See Ky. REV. STAT. § 406.011 (1972) (husband presumed fa-
ther of a child born during wedlock). Under the Uniform Parentage Act, the surro-
gate's husband would be presumed the father of a child conceived during their
marriage, but that presumption could be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence.
UNIFORM PARENT'AGE ACT § 4 (1973). The Uniform Parentage Act does pose some
danger that the surrogate's spouse, having consented in writing to an artificial insemi-
nation, could be treated as the child's legal father. The act provides that when such
consent is given, the consenting husband is treated in law as if he were the child's
natural father. Id. at § 5. In California, if the surrogate were married and cohabiting
with her husband, who is not impotent or sterile at the time of conception, the pre-
sumption of paternity would be irrebuttable. CAL. EvD. CODE § 621 (West Supp.
1981). For a discussion of the problems presented by the California rule, see Com-
ment, Contracts to Bear a Child, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 611, 614-16 (1978).
12. The Kentucky agreements state, that the surrogate and her husband will
permit adoption of the child by "any party" upon the request of the natural father.
Surrogate Parenting Brief, supra note 2, app. at 4. In the event of the natural father's
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Some contracts delineate for the surrogate special re-
quirements related to medically acceptable behavior on her
part during the pregnancy. Usually, she agrees not to smoke,
drink, or take medication without written consent of the phy-
sician involved.' She also agrees to comply with a specific
medical examination schedule." Not all contract promises
made by the surrogate, however, relate to such routine behav-
ior. In some cases the contract also requires that the surrogate
undergo amniocentesis.'5 As to the allocation of risks incident
to the transaction, the surrogate gestator and her spouse agree
to assume all medical pregnancy risks, while the prospective
adoptive parents agree to assume the risk of a defective or
abnormal child.'
In November 1980 the first child subject to a widely pub-
licized surrogate gestation contract was born in Louisville,
Kentucky.' 7 The surrogate gestator, who used the pseudonym
Elizabeth Kane, and her husband promptly terminated their
parental rights to permit adoption by an anonymous married
death, Dr. Levin, the Surrogate Parenting Associates of Louisville Kentucky founder,
may privately place the child for adoption. Id. If the child is awarded to the surro-
gate, her husband, or any individual or organization not related to the natural father,
the contract provides that the natural father is entitled to subrogation against the
surrogate and her husband for any pregnancy-related expenses or child support and
to reimbursement of any consideration already transferred. Id.
13. Id. at 9.
14. Id.
15. Id. Amniocentesis is one test available to detect congenital defects in the
fetus. In that test a sample of the amniotic fluid surrounding the fetus is removed
and tested for chromosomal abnormalities. Amniocentesis does not permit detection
of all fetal defects. See generally Littelfield, The Pregnancy at Risk for a Genetic
Disorder, 282 N.w ENGLAND J. OF MED. 627 (1970). For a thorough discussion of the
legal problems involved in the use of amniocentesis, see Friedman, Legal Implica-
tions of Amniocentesis, 123 U. PA. L. Rzv. 92 (1975).
16. The allocation of these risks between the parties themselves does not neces-
sarily mean that an attending physician would be absolved from liability. See supra
note 9. Surrogate gestation contracts pose interesting problems for insurers. Surro-
gate Parenting Associates' contracts state that the biological father agrees to pay all
expenses not covered by the surrogate's insurance. Surrogate Parenting Brief, supra
note 2, app., at 4. If the surrogate is the primary insured under a policy covering
pregnancy, an insurer might be required to cover her expenses. If, however, the surro-
gate is carried on a spouse's policy, the insurer would have a legitimate complaint
that it intended to insure only pregnancy in which the spouse was the natural father.
Risks of an abnormal birth in a surrogate gestation contract are not necessarily re-
mote. In a recent speech, Dr. Levin affirmed that one child subject to a contract was
born with an unstated abnormality. The prospective adoptive parents accepted the
child. Brammer, Lexington Woman To Be Surrogate Mother, Lexington Leader,
March 16, 1981, at Al.
17. Surrogate Parenting Brief, supra note 2, app., at 4.
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couple.16 Elizabeth Kane has claimed to be the first paid sur-
rogate gestator in this country.1' Media reports allege, how-
ever, that she is not the first surrogate gestator and that
several other surrogate gestation contracts have been com-
pleted. o Surrogate gestation has burst upon the scene as an
accomplished fact with little or no legal fanfare to accompany
its own birth. Although Kentucky has belatedly sought to
regulate the contracts, 1 little prior attention had been given
to the manner of propriety of state regulation.
Proponents of surrogate gestation contracts base their
case on both the constitutional privacy rights of persons in-
volved in the contract and the notion that contractual agree-
ments are capable of sufficiently protecting all interests in-
volved. This article first speculates on how courts might
handle surrogate gestation contracts under existing laws and
offers arguments for and against such contracts. Although
some commentary on the contractual aspect of the agreement
exists, 2 little attention has been given to the privacy argu-
ments of the parties. The major focus of this article, therefore,
is upon the nature of the privacy claims asserted by the pro-
spective parents and the surrogate gestator.'3 Only if the
procreational choice of the parties is a protected one do the
custody or contract rules become relevant.2 ' Consequently,
18. Id.
19. Id. In televised interviews Ms. Kane has suggested that the contract price
was not the sole motivation for her entrance into the contract. Other reports also
indicate that some surrogates are motivated by their desires to aid others rather than
by monetary considerations. Proxy, supra note 3. A discussion of the problems raised
by unpaid gestators is beyond the scope of the present article.
20. Id.
21. The Kentucky attorney general's office issued an opinion in early January
1981 stating that the contracts were against the state's public policy of buying and
selling children. [1980-81] Ky. Avr'v GEN. Op. 81-18 (Banks-Baldwin) (syllabus). The
suit against Surrogate Parenting Associates was filed almost immediately thereafter.
22. Comment, Contracts to Bear a Child, supra note 11, at 611.
23. A number of articles have offered explanations for the protection of a right
of privacy associated with intimate decisions. See generally Gavison, Privacy and the
Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421 (1980); Gelfand, Authority and Autonomy: The
State, The Individual and The Family, 33 U. MIAMI L. REv. 125 (1978); Gerety,
Redefining Privacy, 12 HAR. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 233 (1977); Karst, Intimate Associa-
tion, 89 YALE L.J. 624 (1980); Richards, Sexual Autonomy and the Constitutional
Right to Privacy: A Case Study in Human Rights and the Unwritten Constitution,
30 HASTINGS L.J. 957 (1979).
24. Several other reasons militate for this particular focus. In the first place, the
use of contractual terms to describe the right to a child is incongruous. Whatever the
flexibility of the Uniform Commercial Code, extension of its principles to cover this
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this article traces the procreation cases through their histori-
cal development to show that although a consistent rationale
for protection of women's rights has not been fully developed
by the Court, the Court has taken an important step through
its protection of choice. In conclusion, the article suggests that
protection of choice is, in fact, the basis for the Court's proper
role in regulating procreational decisions.
II. SURROGATE GESTATION AND THE CURRENT LAW.
At the present time state legislation directly addressing
surrogate gestation does not exist. For that reason, states at-
tempting to regulate surrogate gestation immediately would
be forced to do so under existing laws. States might seek to
regulate contracts in one of two ways. Initially, a state could
attempt prospective prohibition of a contract through applica-
tion of its adoption laws.2 5 Prospective prohibition, however,
would not be the sole avenue through which a state might
proceed. Even those states that did not attempt to regulate
surrogate gestation initially might exercise a regulatory im-
pact upon the contracts through resolution of contract or cus-
tody disputes.
Some providers of surrogate gestation services indicate
that they have contacted prospective surrogates through
newspaper advertisements. States could seek to apply prohibi-
tions against advertising children for adoption to surrogate ge-
station contracts.2 Restriction of advertisement, however, is
situation is unwarranted. Likewise, general custody principles fail to provide a dispos-
itive solution to the initial question of the contract's legality. Second, focusing ini-
tially upon contract or custody solutions puts the cart before the horse. The use of
such principles to resolve the hard questions involved is necessary only if a state
cannot constitutionally prohibit the contracts in the first instance. Finally, any con-
stitutional protection which the contract enjoys may have an effect upon the manner
in which contract custody disputes must be resolved. See text accompanying notes
120-42, infra.
25. Regulation through adoption laws is possible because the wife in the trans-
feree couple is not legally related to the child. In most cases, therefore, termination of
the surrogate gestator's parental rights and adoption by the transferee wife are a min-
imum necessary to legally transfer the child under any contract. In addition, some
persons might wish to guard against later problems with paternity by terminating the
surrogate gestator's husband's parental rights and providing for adoption by the bio-
logical father. The latter practice would avoid problems with presumptions regarding
paternity. See supra note 11.
26. Many states have a statutory prohibition against the advertisement of chil-
dren for adoption. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-10-8 (1931); CAL. CIV. CODE § 224p (West
Supp. 1981); GA. CODE § 74-418 (1981); KAN. STAT. § 65-609 (1919); Ky. REV. STAT. §
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impermissible if the underlying activity is constitutionally
protected 27 and is of little significance in deterring such con-
tracts in any case. A number of states severely restrict permis-
sible payments in connection with adoption"8 or require dis-
closure or approval of all fees paid. '9 Because the transfer of a
child under a surrogate gestation contract is assumed to re-
quire adoption by the woman not the biological mother, these
adoption regulations could be imposed upon a surrogate ges-
tation contract to prevent payment of any fees over the surro-
gate gestator's expenses. 0 Finally, some states require social
199.590 (Baldwin 1980); NEV. REV. STAT. § 127.310 (1980); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
170-E: 14 (1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-38 (1976); OHIO REV. CODE § 103-17 (1970);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.36.040 (1979).
27. Restrictions on the advertisement of contraceptives have been struck down
by the Supreme Court. Carey v. Population Serv. Int., 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
28. See ARiz. REV. STAT. § 8-126 (1974) (prohibits fees except to licensed agen-
cies); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-115 (1973) (prohibits fees except for attorney fees and
those approved by court); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 928(b) (Supp. 1980) (fees limited
to attorney fees, court costs, and actual placement costs of agencies); D.C. CODE EN-
CYCL. § 32-790 (West Supp. 1970) (limits fees except for costs to charitable organiza-
tions); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.212 (West Supp. 1981) (only licensed agencies may
charge fee; any fee over $500 must be disclosed); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 1701
(Smith-Hurd 1980) (prohibits fees except for those charged by licensed agency); Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.590 (Baldwin 1980) (prohibits fees except for those charged by
licensed agency); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 8204 (1980) (limits fees to reasonable
costs of services); MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 83 (1981) (fees limited to costs); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 710.54 (Supp. 1980) (MICH. STAT. ANN. § 278.3178 (555.54) (Calla-
ghan 1980)) (limits fees to those approved by court); NEV. REV. STAT. § 127.290 (1980)
(compensation permitted for operating costs only for licensed child placement
agency); N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-54 (West Supp. 1981) (prohibits payment of fee
except to approved adoption agency); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 374(6) (McKinney 1980)
(only authorized agency may charge fees); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48.37 (1976) (forbids
anyone but licensed child placement agency from receiving payment); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 36-136 (Supp. 1980) (prohibits payment of fees except to licensed agency);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-8a-1 (1974) (forbids compensation except to licensed agency).
29. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-109 (Supp. 1981) (all cases); ARK. STAT. ANN.
§ 56-211(a) (Supp. 1971) (exception for step-parent adoption); CAL. CIV. CODE § 224r
(West Supp. 1981) (exception for step-parent adoption); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-
110(4) (1973) (all cases); Dn. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 928(b) (Supp. 1980) (all cases);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.132 (West Supp. 1981) (exception for step-parent adoption); GA.
CODE ANN. § 74-407(b) (Supp. 1980) (exception for step-parent adoption); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 40, § 1517 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980) (exception for step-parent adoption);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 600.9 (West Supp. 1980) (exception for step-parent adoption);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 710.54 (Supp. 1980) MICH. STAT. ANN. § 273178 (555.54)
(all cases); N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-55 (West Supp. 1981) (exception for step-par-
ent adoption); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-15-10 (1971) (exception for step-parent adop-
tion); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2531 (Purdon Supp. 1981) (exception for brothers,
sisters, niece, or nephew adoption).
30. The rule in many states exempting step-parent adoptions from any disclo-
sure requirement could make the implementation of such a prohibition difficult.
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service agency approval of many adoptions," and licensing of
all child-placing agencies.82 Agency disapproval of contracts or
a refusal to license facilitator services would have a regulatory
impact.
The initial attempts to regulate surrogate gestation have
been of the prospective variety. In early 1980, a Michigan
couple interested in entering into a surrogate gestation con-
tract sought a declaratory judgment that Michigan adoption
laws, which prohibit the exchange of money, other considera-
tion, or thing of value in connection with adoption, are uncon-
stitutionally vague as well as violative of a constitutional right
of privacy. In Doe v. Kelley,"s the Michigan trial court dis-
missed the vagueness attack because of its view that "other
consideration or thing of value" gave notice to reasonably in-
telligent persons of what things cannot be exchanged in con-
nection with adoption. The court also held that the statute
did not violate the plaintiffs' personal privacy rights.8 ' The
court characterized the plaintiffs' asserted right as the right to
pay money for the adoption of a child. Thus labeled, the right
was not one of the same personal nature normally associated
with the right of privacy. The court, however, went on to state
that even if the plaintiffs' rights fell within the zone of pri-
vacy, the state's interest in preventing commercialism from
affecting a decision to conceive a child was sufficiently corn-
31. Many states do not require investigation in a step-parent adoption. See
ALA. CODE § 26-10-2 (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 20.15.100(g) (Cum. Supp. 1980); AIz.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-105(n) (Supp. 1980); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-212(c) (Supp. 1981);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-111 (1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-63(a) (West Supp.
1981); D.C. CODE ENCYCL. § 16-308 (West Supp. 1980); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.092
(West Supp. 1981) (within court's discretion); GA. CODE ANN. § 74-409 (1980); IDAHO
CODE § 16-1506 (Supp. 1981); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 1508 (Smith-Hurd 1980); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 600.8(f) (West Supp. 1981); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2278 (1976); MASS.
ANN. LAWS ch. 210, § 5A (Michie/Law Co-op 1981); MIss. CODE ANN. § 93-17-11
(1973) (discretion of court); Mo. REV. STAT. § 453-0708 (1977); MONT. REV. CODES
ANN. § 40-8-123 (1979) (court discretion); NEV. REV. STAT. § 127.120 (1979); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 9:3-48(2) (West Supp. 1981); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-7-12 (1978) (court
discretion); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-15-11(5) (interim Supp. 1979); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10,
§ 60.13 (West 1971); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-2 (Supp. 1980); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§ 25-6-10 (Supp. 1980); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-118 (Supp. 1980) (court may waive);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-14 (1977).
32. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 2249 (West Supp. 1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.202
(West Supp. 1981); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, § 2214 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980); MICH.
CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.124 (Supp. 1980); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 25.358(24) (1974); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 9.3-40 (West Supp. 1981).
33. 6 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 3011 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Jan. 28, 1980).
34. Id. at 3013.
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pelling to permit a state to prohibit payment for a surrogate
gestation contract.3
5
In a second instance of attempted state regulation of a
surrogate gestation contract, proponents of the contract have
defended against the state attorney general's attempt to en-
join them, relying upon a distinction between adoption and
termination of parental rights and an exception in the adop-
tion statutes for private, intrafamily adoptions.31 Kentucky
participants argued that their contract provided for the termi-
nation of parental rights rather than for adoption and that
termination of parental rights cannot be regulated through
adoption laws.87 Drafters of the Kentucky surrogate gestation
contracts have also based their claim of legality upon an ex-
ception which provides that the state Department of Human
Resources need not be consulted in cases of adoption by a
step-parent."
Because most known surrogate gestation contracts have
been performed rather than breached, no example of regula-
tion through contract or custody resolutions is available. A
number of problems arise, however, from any attempt to ap-
ply contractual principles to a surrogate gestation dispute.
Consider the problem that faces a court should the surrogate
gestator decide not to perform the contract. Would a legal
system that has never required the personal performance of
an opera singer" or an athlete' require specific performance
35. Id. at 3014.
36. Surrogate Parenting Brief, supra note 2, Kentucky's attorney general has
sought a declaratory judgment that surrogate gestation contracts contravene the
state's public policy against baby selling. The attorney general also alleges that the
contracts violate a number of Kentucky statutes. See Ky. REV. STAT. § 199.500(5)
(1980) (consent for adoption may not be given prior to the fifth day after the birth of
the child); Id. § 199.590(2) (no unlicensed person, agency, or institution may charge a
fee nor accept renumeration for placement of a child); Id. § 199.601(2) (petition for
termination of parental rights may not be filed prior to five days after the birth of the
child): Id. § 199.990(4) (prescribing penalities for violation of prior sections).
37. Because a valid consent for adoption cannot be given until five days after
the child's birth, the drafters of the surrogate gestation contracts have attempted to
characterize their contracts as agreements to terminate parental rights. Id. §
199.500(5). The termination of parental rights statute states that no petition may be
filed during the five day period. Id. § 199.601(2). Read literally, it does not prohibit
any consent to terminate parental rights, only the petition's filing.
38. See id. § 199.470(4)(a) (exempting step-parent adoptions from a general re-
quirement that a child be placed by a licensed agency or with the approval of the
Department of Human Resources).
39. See Lumley v. Wagner, 42 Eng. Rep. 687, 1 DeGex, MacNaughten &
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in this case? Courts might face additional dilemmas should
either party breach the contract after the child's birth. Even
those attorneys who pioneered surrogate gestation contracts
concede that should the surrogate gestator refuse to relinquish
the child for adoption, it is improbable that a court would or-
der a transfer based solely on contract principles." Con-
versely, should the prospective adoptive parents refuse to ac-
cept the child, it is unlikely that a court would require them
to do so. Viewed simply as contracts, firmly entrenched
grounds exist for declaring such agreements unenforceable as
against public policy."2
In cases in which the contracts themselves were unen-
forceable, standards applicable to resolution of custody dis-
putes might provide guidance."s If a refusal to surrender the
child or, alternatively, a refusal to accept the child were
treated as a routine custody and support matter, the following
results could occur. If the surrogate gestator admitted the
child's paternity, 4 but refused to surrender the child, a court
might award custody to either the surrogate or to the biologi-
cal father. The likelihood of either parent prevailing would
Gordon 604(Ch. App. 1852). Of course, the defendant in Lumley was enjoined from
appearing elsewhere. Although this rule might operate to permit an injunction against
the transfer of the child to third parties, it would not apply to the surrogate's reten-
tion of the child. The rule that a contract for distinctly personal, nondelegable ser-
vices will not be enforced by specific performance is nearly universal. The reasons
given for the refusal to enforce are the difficulty of gauging the quality of any per-
formance rendered, prejudice against a species of involuntary servitude, and a reluc-
tance to force a continued relationship between antagonistic parties. 5A A. CORBIN,
CONTRACTS § 1204(1951).
40. Houston Oilers v. Neely, 361 F.2d 36 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 840
(1966).
41. Cassidy, supra note 5.
42. RESTATEMENT OF CoNrsACTS § 583, Comment a, Illustration 1 (1933) (bar-
gain for custody illegal unless it reflects the child's welfare); Id. § 591, Comment a(bargain unduly restricting freedom or jeopardizing life is illegal even if originally
entered into voluntarily). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRAcTs § 333, Com-
ment a (1977).
43. The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act provides the following standards for
custody adjudication. The court must determine custody in accordance with the best
interest of the child. The court shall consider all relevant factors including the wishes
of the child's parents, the wishes of the child, the child's interaction and interrela-
tionship with parents, siblings, and other persons who may significantly affect the
child's best interest, the child's adjustment to home, school, and community, and the
mental and physical health of all involved individuals. UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DI-
VORCE ACT § 402 (1973).
44. For a discussion of the problems involved in a determination of paternity,
see supra note 11.
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depend upon the court's assessment of the best interest of the
child,' 5 including whether the court applied any presumption
of maternal preference.' The losing parent might be awarded
visitation rights.47 Such awards to unwed fathers are not un-
common.'8 Additionally, either parent might be required to
provide support for the child.' 9
a
III. ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST SURROGATE GESTATION
One argument for surrogate gestation is that such con-
tracts facilitate reproductive freedom for both sexes. Surro-
gates gestation is seen by some proponents as an analog to
artificial insemination. 0 So viewed, a contract for surrogate
45. The best interest of the child focuses upon a combination of economic, soci-
ological and psychological factors. Often, however, the child's attachment to a psy-
chological parent is the focus of the determination. See J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A.
SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD (1973). The application of the stan-
dard is rendered less vague by developmental-psychological approaches. Batt, Child
Custody Disputes: A Developmental-Psychological Approach to Proof and Decision-
making, 12 WILLAMETTE L.J. 491(1976). That approach, however, does not eliminate
the problems of prediction inherent in awarding custody of a newborn.
46. Historically, courts applied a tender years presumption that required the
award of very young children to a mother who was not found unfit. See Roth, The
Tender Years Presumption in Custody Cases, 15 J. FAM. L. 423 (1976-77). A number
of states have statutorily overruled such a presumption. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 25-332 (1973); CAL. CIv. CODE § 4600 (West Supp. 1979); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
61.13(2)(b) (West Supp. 1979); Ky. REv. STAT. § 403.270 (Supp. 1980); N.Y. Dom.
REL. LAW § 240 (McKinney 1976). Other courts have stricken the presumption for
public policy reasons or on grounds of unconstitutionality. In re Marriage of Winter,
223 N.W.2d 165 (Iowa 1974) (against public policy); Commonwealth ex. rel Spriggs v.
Carson, 470 Pa. 290, 368 A.2d 635 (1977); (unconstitutional). But see Thompson v.
Thompson, 57 Ala. 57, 326 So. 2d 124 (1975) (tender years presumption permissible
as a factual presumption); J.B. v. A.B., 242 S.E.2d 248 (W. Va. App. 1978) (continu-
ing to apply the presumption on the ground that it reflects the division of labor in the
average family).
47. Generally a parent not granted custody is entitled to reasonable visitation
rights unless the court finds, after a hearing, that visitation would endanger seriously
the child's physical, mental, moral, or emotional health. UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND Di-
VORCE ACT § 407 (1973).
48. An unwed father may be awarded visitation if it is in the best interest of the
child. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Bonafonte, 172 Conn. 612, 376 A.2d 69 (1977); Mixon v.
Mize, 198 So. 2d 373 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 204 So. 2d 211 (Fla. 1967);
Phillips v. Herlander, 535 S.W.2d 72 (Ky. 1975); Gardner v. Rothman, 370 Mass. 79,
345 N.E.2d 370 (1976); Pearson v. Clark, 382 So.2d 482 (Miss. 1980); J.M.S. v.H.A.,
242 S.E.2d 696 (W. Va. 1978).
49. The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act provides that the court may order
either or both parents owing a duty of support to a child to pay amounts reasonable
and necessary for his or her support. UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 309
(1973).
50. Some of the rules developed for artificial insemination, however, are them-
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gestation raises few objections. Two of the original social ob-
jections to artificial insemination-that it amounted to adul-
tery51 and threatened the marital relationship 52-have not
prevented the widespread use of the technique. Changing so-
cial attitudes toward artificial insemination could portend so-
cial acceptance for surrogate gestation as well. Indeed, an ar-
gument can be made that to deprive a married couple unable
to bear children because of the wife's infertility an opportu-
nity to have a child of their own is unfair, when a partnership
in which a husband is infertile may have a child through arti-
ficial insemination. Other difficulties, however, would have to
be balanced against that argument. Removal of social objec-
tions by comparison to artificial insemination does not solve
all problems raised by the contracts. For example, a third ob-
jection to artificial insemination-that it is unclear who is the
child's legal father"1--carries over to surrogate gestation con-
tracts and raises significant obstacles.
The need to allocate the child to one set of legal parents
might be satisfied by legislation making the husband of the
surrogate the legal father of the child if she breached the
agreement by refusing to surrender the child" and otherwise
nominating the biological father as the legal father. Further-
more, a definition of mother that would render the adoption
process unnecessary could be developed. That definition
might operate in one of two ways. First, the spouse of the bio-
logical father could be defined as the legal mother of the child
once conception had occurred. That solution would also re-
quire some definition of the surogate's status. The surrogate's
rights as the carrier of the child would need to be carefully
spelled out in order to protect her. For instance, she might
retain the right to terminate the pregnancy but have no rights
selves potential problems for persons wishing to enter into a surrogate gestation con-
tract. For example, the rule that a child conceived through artificial insemination
after a husband's written consent is treated as a child of that husband. See supra
note 11.
51. Orford v. Orford, 58 D.L.R. 251 (Can. 1921) (artificial insemination involves
the "essence" of adultery because it surrenders the wife's reproductive faculties to
one not the husband).
52. See, W. FINEGOLD, supra note 3, at 19-24.
53. Gursky v. Gursky, 39 Misc. 2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
54. See generally Shaman, Legal Aspects of Artificial Insemination, 18 J. FAM.
LAW 331 (1979-80); Smith, Through a Test Tube Darkly: Artificial Insemination and
The Law, 67 MIcH. L. Rav. 127 (1968); Wadlington, Artificial Insemination: The
Dangers of A Poorly Kept Secret, 64 Nw. U.L. Rzv. 777 (1970).
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to custody of a resulting child.58 Alternatively, the spouse of
the biological father could be nominated as the legal mother
of any resulting live birth.
If reproductive freedom is the basis for surrogate gesta-
tion contracts, such contracts could also provide the opportu-
nity to have children to nontraditional parents. Single per-
sons, homosexual couples, and others who wish to have
children might use surrogate gestation to acquire a child not
available through their own relationships. 6 Furthermore,
complete reproductive freedom would seem to require that
surrogate gestation would not necessarily be limited to infer-
tile women. 7 Persons who choose not to have a child because
of genetic incompatibility with a partner might choose surro-
gate gestation as an alternative to the risk of a defective child.
Some women might decide for other personal reasons to shift
the task of child-bearing to other women.
The major argument against surrogate gestation is that
the practce commercializes the birth of children. A long-
standing, widespread public policy prohibits the payment of
money in connection with adoption. 8 The prohibition reflects
the state's parens patriae interest in minor children. That in-
terest would be thwarted if a contractual agreement could re-
place a best interest determination. Other arguments against
surrogate gestation derive from its impact upon women. Bear-
ing children for monetary reward could mean encouragement
55. This solution would preserve the surrogate's rights under Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973).
56. In a report on in vitro fertilization and embryo transfer, the Ethics Advisory
Board for the Department of Health, Education and Welfare has suggested that an
unmarried woman who wished to use in vitro fertilization followed by embryo trans-
fer to a surrogate in order to avoid the inconvenience of pregnancy would have
neither marital privacy rights nor procreative capacity in the normal sense to protect.
U.S. DEP'T HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS:
HEW SUPPORT OF HUMAN IN VITRO FERTILIZATION AND EMBRYO TRANSFER: REPORT OF
THE ETHICS ADVISORY BOARD, 44 Fed. Reg. 35,033, 35,048 (1979). The Supreme Court
in protecting privacy rights indicated, however, that unmarried persons enjoy the
same right of choice as do married couples. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
Additionally, to suggest that only natural procreative capacities are constitutionally
protected begs the question. Indeed, in a surrogate gestation contract the prospective
adoptive mother has no natural procreative capacity. Both the prospective adoptive
father and the surrogate, however, do possess such capacity. The real issue is the
individual's right to form the relationship. Futhermore, the rights are interdependent
because they do arise out of a relationship.
57. But see REPORT OF THE ETHICS ADVISORY BOARD, supra note 56, at 35,049.
58. See supra note 28.
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for women to sell their childbearing capacity.
Like other alternative methods of conceiving and bearing
children, surrogate gestation is a new practice for which little
or no empirical data exists. So few surrogate gestation con-
tracts have been publicly acknowledged that it is impossible
to judge the future effects of the practice. In the interim, how-
ever, courts and legislatures may be called upon to decide
whether the use of surrogate gestation contracts may be pro-
hibited or regulated by a state. In those instances, the con-
tracting parties will probably assert a constitutional right of
privacy based on the Supreme Court's past rulings on procrea-
tional choice.
IV. PRIVACY RIGHTS AND PROCREATIONAL DECISIONS
Over the past twenty years the Supreme Court has con-
sistently upheld the notion that decisions relating to matters
of personal privacy are protected from unwarranted govern-
mental intrusion. During this period, the Court has touched
upon both the range of protected decisions within the zone of
privacy and the classes of persons entitled to make those deci-
sions. One such decision clearly lies at the heart of that pro-
tected zone: the individual decision whether to bear or beget a
child." Most of the Court's opinions in this area have been
decided in the context of contraception and abortion.a As a
result of individual challenges to state laws regulating the use
and sale of contraceptives, states may neither bar the use of
contraceptives nor require distribution only by particular
sources. 1 As to abortion, a state may intervene only under
limited circumstances, and it may not permit other persons to
exercise a unilateral veto over the abortion decision.2 Both
classes of cases establish an area within which individual
choices to limit childbirth may not be superseded absent a
59. Carey v. Population Servs. Int., 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Planned Parenthood of
Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
60. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (abortion); Carey v. Population Servs.
Int. 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (contraception); Planned Parenthood of Mo. v. Danforth, 428
U.S. 52 (1976) (abortion); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (abortion); Doe v. Bolton,
410 U.S. 179 (1973) (abortion); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (contracep-
tion); Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (contraception).
61. Carey v. Population Servs. Int., 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Eisenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S. 438 (1977); Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479 (1969).
62. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979); Planned Parenthood of Mo. v. Dan-
forth, 428 U.S. 52 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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compelling and narrowly focused state interest.
The focus of the Court's protection is choice rather than
any particular act, so individual freedom in this area cannot
be limited to a right not to procreate. The right to make a
choice clearly involves a right to decide in either manner-to
have a child as well as not to have a child. The Court's most
recent cases contain language which reflects such an under-
standing of choice. For example, in Carey v. Population Ser-
vices International," the Court characterized the decision of
"whether to accomplish or prevent conception" as falling
within the very center of constitutional protection. 4 Thus, the
claim that state regulations which prevent surrogate gestation
contracts impinge upon protected individual freedoms cannot
be superficially dismissed by an argument that the Court has
established only a right not to procreate. On the other hand,
the mere fact that surrogate gestation contracts involve mat-
ters of procreational choice does not mean that participants in
such contracts assert a privacy claim identical to that availa-
ble for contraception or abortion decisions."'
A description of procreational rights as basic, fundamen-
tal rights does little to explain why choices regarding those
rights have been protected. In order to determine whether pri-
vacy claims related to the use of contraceptives, abortion, or
surrogate gestation are similar the individual interest in mak-
ing each choice must be identified. For both contraceptive use
and abortion the examination of the interests at stake must
begin with the Court's past opinions. If the contraception and
abortion opinions are placed in their historical and social con-
text, they demonstrate that the Court's perception of the in-
terest protected by freedom of choice has undergone signifi-
cant change. This article argues that the change is, at least in
part, reflective of the changing social status of women.
63. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
64. Id. at 685.
65. This is merely another way of saying that the interests sought to be pro-
tected in the surrogate gestation contract may not be the same as those identified in
the abortion and contraception cases. Cf. B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CON-
FLICTS OF LAW (1963). Identifying the purpose for which the Court protects a particu-
lar choice is, however, only half of the question. The second half is whether choice




A. The Changing Role of Women in America
The Court decided the contraception and abortion cases
during a period of radical change for American women. These
cases span a thirty-year period from 1943 when the Court dis-
missed the appeal in Tileston v. Ullman"' to 1973 when it de-
cided Roe v. Wade.67 Those same thirty years witnessed re-
markable changes in the social roles and expectations of
women. One measure of that change was women's employ-
ment outside of the home. Between 1900 and 1940 women ac-
counted for approximately 25% of the work force 8 and were
generally young, single, and poor." By 1970 nearly one-half of
all women over sixteen were in the labor force. 70 Furthermore,
these post-1940 working women exhibited a very different so-
cial profile from their pre-1940 sisters, namely, they were
older, married, and mothers.7 1 Obviously, the large-scale entry
of these women with children into the labor market signified
that women were no longer occupying the traditionally exclu-
sive social role of wife and mother.72 Patterns of family behav-
ior also responded to this shift as men began to assume more
responsibility for children and domestic tasks.73
This change in the social role of women paralleled the
Court's movement toward the recognition of an individual in-
terest in women who wished to avoid childbirth. In contrast to
its early protection of rights to family continuation, 4 the
Court had, by 1973, not only recognized that individual inter-
66. 318 U.S. 44 (1943).
67. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
68. W. CHAFE, Looking Backward in Order to Look Forward: Women, Work
and Social Values in America in WOMEN AND THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 12 (1979).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. The percentage of unmarried women working remained relatively con-
stant during the thirty-year period while the percentage of married women workers
tripled. Id. A better indication of changing social roles is the entry into the labor
force of women with small children. Between 1959 and 1974 the employment rate for
mothers with children under three doubled. Id. at 25.
72. Some courts, however, refuse to recognize this change. See J.B. v. A.B., 242
S.E.2d 248 (W. Va. App. 1978) (maternal responsibility for children continues to re-
flect division of labor in the average family).
73. See generally, Hayghe, Families and the rise of working wives-an over-
view, MONTHLY LAB REV., May 1976, at 12; Hedges and Barnett, Working Women
and the Division of Household Tasks, MONTHLY LAB. REV., April 1972 at 9; Lipman-
Blueman, Role De-Differentiation as a System Response to Crises: Occupational and
Political Roles of Women, 43 Soc. INQUIRY 105 (1973).
74. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1943).
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ests would not be fully protected by protection of married
couples, 75 but also had conceded that women's particularized
interests in avoiding childbirth deserved protection. 7 In part,
this recognition was a reflection of the fact that women al-
ready had achieved a large measure of social independence.
Even more importantly, the Court implicitly recognized that
women are affected differently and more drastically than men
by the unavailability of choice with regard to childbirth.
B. Male-centered Concerns: Skinner and Griswold
Long before the Supreme Court decided Griswold v. Con-
necticut,77 it had held that individuals have certain basic
rights with regard to procreation. A striking difference is ap-
parent, however, in the right of choice as it has developed in
the Supreme Court's later decisions and its original enuncia-
tion by Mr. Justice Douglas in Skinner v. Oklahoma 7 and
Griswold.7 9 Both cases were concerned with the impact of
state intrusion upon procreational choice. The protective
structure espoused by these decisions, however, related to the
preservation of a system of patriarchal family structure8" and
authority. Neither emphasized the particular impact upon wo-
men and children of the unavailability of choice.
In Skinner, when Justice Douglas stressed that sterliza-
tion legislation involves one of the basic civil rights of man
75. Compare Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), with Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
76. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
77. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
78. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
79. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
80. A patriarchal family structure is one in which both individual families and
society as a whole are dominated by male authority. See generally Woman, Culture
and Society-A Theoretical Overview in WOMAN, CULTURE AND SOCIETY 17-42 (M.
Rosalidz & Lamphere eds. 1974). The search for an explanation of male social domi-
nation and consequent female subordination is not a new task. Some theorists have
posited that male domination is biologically based. That is, physical strength, the
needs of a hunting culture and the weakening effect of pregnancy upon women are
historically responsible for male dominance. See generally C. LEVI-STRAUSS, THE
FAMILY IN MAN, CULTURE AND SOCIETY 261 (Shapiro ed. 1956); L. TIGER, MEN IN
GROUPS (1968). Others have argued that women originally dominated men. See gener-
ally J. BACOFEN, THE MOTHERS (1861); R. BRIFFAULT, THE MOTHERS (1927); A. RICH,
OF WOMAN BORN (1978). Whatever the origins of male authority, male dominance is a
clearly reflected feature of western society. Moreover, that domination is supported,
not only by family structure, but by other social and political institutions such as
illegitimacy. See text accompanying notes 96-108 infra.
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because "procreation [is] fundamental to the very existence
and survival of the race"'" he was referring literally to men
because Skinner is a decision about men's rights. For males,
having children does not involve the actual experience of
pregnancy nor has it traditionally involved the close relation-
ship that women experience with infants and small Children. 2
Rather, men's general procreative concerns have related pri-
marily to the continuation of family lines," and that area of
male concern clearly fuels Skinner.84
In Griswold v. Connecticut s5 Justice Douglas continued
the Skinner theme of freedom from government intervention.
In his famous penumbras and emanations essay, 8  he intro-
duced the notion of marital privacy. Although the Constitu-
tion itself does not mention marriage as a fundamental right,
81. 316 U.S. at 541.
82. For a discussion of importance of role differentiation, see text accompanying
note 107 infra.
83. See generally C. ANDREAS, SEX AND CASTE IN AMERICA (1971); K. MILLET,
SEXUAL POLITICS (1969); Freeman, The Legal Basis of the Sexual Caste System, 5
VA. U.L. REV. 203 (1971); Powers, Sex Segregation and the Ambivalent Directions of
Sex Discrimination Law, 1979 Wis. L. REV. 55; Wallach & Tenoso, A Vindication of
the Rights of Unmarried Mothers and Their Children: An Analysis of the Institu-
tion of Illegitimacy, Equal Protection and the Uniform Parentage Act, 23 KAN. L.
REV. 23 (1974). Identification of this generalized concern does not mean that males
are never concerned for their individual relationships with their children. The con-
cerns noted here are those reenforced by the social system-not those that prevail in
individual families. Data from social and anthropological studies indicates that West-
ern society has traditionally afforded great weight to male interests in the continua-
tion and identification of family lines. The strength of that interest can best be
demonstrated by the fact that this is the interest which has received legal protection.
84. Perhaps the most visible evidence of the male interest in the continuation of
family lines is the naming process. Families in Western civilization use male sur-
names. Linguists have shown that the naming process is central to both the self-
concept of the individual and to the allocation of power among individuals. C. MILLER
& K. SwIFr, WORDS AND WOMEN 1, 9 (1976). Additional evidence of the importance of
the right to control names can be found in litigation challenging a state's right to
require the use of husbands' surnames by married women. Although courts have trivi-
alized women's claims in this matter, the very need to interdict women's rights is
demonstrative of the power balance involved. See Whitlow v. Hodges, 539 F.2d 582
(6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 1029 (1976); Forbush v. Wallace, 341 F. Supp.
217 (M.D. Ala. 1971), aff'd per curiam, 405 U.S. 970 (1972). See also Karst, "A Dis-
crimination So Trivial": A Note on Law and the Symbolism of Women's Depen-
dency, 35 OHIO ST. L.J. 546 (1974). In addition to the evidence presented by the
naming process, historians have long recognized the connection between the devolu-
tion of private property and interests in the perpetuation of a patriarchal family sys-
tem. See e.g., F. ENGELS, THE ORIGINS OF THE FAMILY (4th ed. 1942).
85. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
86. Id. at 483.
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the Bill of Rights' various guarantees create a zone of personal
privacy surrounding the marital relationship.8 7 The state can-
not prohibit married persons' use of contraceptive devices be-
cause that prohibition would have a maximum destructive im-
pact upon the marital relationship. 8
A state rule prohibiting the use of contraceptives could
potentially destroy the marriage relatioship in at least two
ways: the economic hardship caused by unplanned children
and the emotional complexity introduced into the relationship
by the presence of children who demand attention and nur-
ture. Griswold, however, did not discuss either of these areas;
instead, Justice Douglas focused on the example of state inva-
sion into the marital bedroom. 9 Drastic as this example may
have seemed, it clearly illustrated his point: a man's home is
his castle, and Griswold protects all persons concerned by
protecting that dominion.
Griswold is based upon the assumptions that marriage is
a unity of two persons and that family decisions should not be
subject to state intervention. The notion, however, that mar-
riage creates an independent unity has an historical meaning
that cannot be ignored. Historically, at common law the hus-
band and the wife were regarded as one and the husband was
the one.' 0 Thus, although any right extended to marriage was
assumed to be enjoyed by both parties, as a practical matter
protection of the family unit did nothing to identify or ex-
plore women's critical individual interest in childbirth."
Although both Skinner and Griswold afford constitu-
tional protection to the private decision of whether or not to
bear children, the freedom they promote is not freedom for
individuals, but freedom only for families. Concern for equal-
ity within the marital relationship or with the impact of un-
wanted pregnancy upon the relationship of mothers and chil-
dren had yet to develop.
C. Eisenstadt, Roe, and Women's Rights.
In the early seventies the Court's opinions on contracep-
87. Id. at 483-85.
88. Id. at 485-86.
89. Id.
90. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 442-45 (1765).
91. For a discussion of the way in which protection for family units promotes
female dependency, see text accompanying notes 96-99 infra.
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tion took an important turn. In Eisenstadt v. Baird92 the
Court held that the state of Massachusetts could not prevent
the distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons. In re-
fusing to base its opinion on the ground that Massachusetts
could not adhere to a moral viewpoint which punished extra-
marital sex,93 the Court adopted a new view of the relation-
ship it had protected in Griswold. Eisenstadt recognized that
the marital relationship was not a unity, but rather an associ-
ation of two emotionally and intellectually distinct individu-
als."' Thus, the right of personal privacy belonged to individu-
als, rather than to the marital unit, and it extended to all
adults regardless of their marital status.95
The recognition that individual decisions concerning
childbirth were protected was a turning point for women's sta-
tus. Eisenstadt is the first case in which the Court acknowl-
edged the uniqueness of women's interests in the contracep-
tion decision. At least two interests related to that decision
are unique to women. First, and most obvious, is the reality
that the physical consequences of conception differ for men
and women. Only women become pregnant. Women, there-
fore, have a particular interest in childbearing, which is re-
lated to their physical involvement in pregnancy. Second, and
less apparent, is the unique interest that women have in
avoiding the discrimination related to pregnancy outside of
marriage. Pregnancy outside of marriage subjected women to
the stigma associated with illegitimacy. Giving women the
choice to use contraceptives to prevent pregnancy out of wed-
lock permitted women to avoid that unfair stigma.
The stigma rising from illegitimacy was unfair to women
because they were penalized more severely than males for
committing the same act. Illegitimacy had historically been
used to assure that wealth and authority would pass only to
the true biological heirs of males who controlled the devolving
assets. The institution thus served a social need to identify
men's children. It was extremely important that a child be-
longed to an identified father in a culture that made inheri-
tance and other economic benefits turn on the father-child
connection. Because paternity, however, is not marked by any
92. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
93. Id. at 451.
94. 405 U.S. at 453.
95. Id.
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physical distinction, identifying a child's father was signifi-
cantly more difficult. Requiring a woman to attach herself to
one male provided assurance to that male that he was the fa-
ther of any child borne by that woman."
Illegitimacy not only permitted men to assure themselves
of legitimate children, but also protected them against the
claims of those children whom they did not wish to legiti-
mate. 9 7 That assurance guaranteed that when males had sex-
ual access to women outside of marriage, they would not be
penalized for their acts.9 The consequences, then, of having
children out of wedlock were very different for men and wo-
men. Women had a special individual interest in not bearing a
child under circumstances in which they would receive a dif-
ferent penalty from that received by men for the same activ-
ity. That individual interest lies at the very heart of the no-
tion of invidious discrimination. The Court in Eisenstadt
implicitly recognized that women and their illegitimate off-
spring suffer such discrimination."9 Giving unmarried women
legal access to contraceptives permitted them to avoid an un-
fair social penalty by preventing the birth of an illegitimate
child. The Court was thus able to advance women's interest in
equal treatment by affording them the means to protect
themselves.
In the abortion cases, 100 the Court continued to recognize
women's unique interest in determining whether to bear a
child. Despite the difficult issues raised by the presence of po-
96. See F. ENGLES, supra note 84.
97. Interestingly none of the Supreme Court's cases on illegitimacy have in-
cluded any factual issue of paternity. In every instance no allegation was made that
the putative father was not the biological father of the child.
98. Women, however, would be threatened for themselves and for their chil-
dren. Wallach & Tenoso, supra note 83.
99. The Court's unwillingness to strike down state statutes distinguishing the
inheritance rights of illegitimates from those of legitimate children does not mean
that Eisenstadt is not supported by the discriminatory impact of illegitimacy. When
the Court deals with illegitimacy and property it is less likely to find that the state
scheme is discriminatory because to do so would require the Court to dismantle an
integral part of the property expectations underlying patriarchy. See Lalli v. Lalli,
439 U.S. 259 (1978). Giving an individual the power to opt out of a system that dis-
criminates against him is one thing. To ask the Court to dismantle a property system
is a request that it destroy a system of which it is an integral part. Thus, the Court is
more comfortable eliminating illegitimacy's discrimination when it does not offend
the property system. Cf. Karat, supra note 23, at 676-82.
100. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
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tential human life, the Court in Roe v. Wade'01 steadfastly
held to a rule allowing women the choice to terminate a preg-
nancy in its early stages. 102 In allocating that choice, the Court
spoke of the detriment0 " to women of a state's refusal to per-
mit abortion. One possible meaning of the Court's use of the
word "detriment" is related to women's physical involvement
with childbearing. 14 As pregnancy occurs inside a woman's
body, she has a special interest in its physical impact upon
her. The physical and psychological effects' 08 of pregnancy,
however, are not the sole support of the Court's decision in
Roe. The opinion does not require that women demonstrate
either physical or psychological harm prior to determining
that they wish to have an abortion. Indeed, because the rules
in Roe and subsequent cases'0 6 extend this option to women
as a class, they must be based upon effects more general than
either physical or psychological harm. The most generalized
effect of an unterminated pregnancy is that a woman becomes
a mother. Therefore, the physical condition of pregnancy, by
itself, does not require that women be permitted to determine
whether to bear a child. Rather, an aspect of motherhood
gives women the choice.10 7
101. 410 U.S. at 160.
102. Id. at 154.
103. Id. at 153.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979); Planned Parenthood of Mo. v. Dan-
forth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
107. See generally Chodorow, Family Structure and Feminine Personality, in
WOMAN, CULTURE AND SOCIETY 43 (M. Rosaldo and L. Lamphere ed., 1974);
Chodorow, Being and Doing: A Cross-Cultural Examination of the Socialization of
Males and Females, in WOMEN IN SEXIST SOCIETY (V. Gornick & B. Moran ed., 1971).
Although both men and women become parents of a child born to them, for women
this relationship has traditionally had a significantly different impact. A culture
might exist in which the person who gives physical birth to a child is not necessarily
the individual responsible for its care or at least shares that responsibility with other
family members. Outside of breastfeeding newborn infants, such a child care role can
clearly be performed by members of either sex. Yet this hypothetical division of gen-
der-neutral roles does not reflect traditional cultural values, placing upon mothers
almost total responsibility for child care. The cultural role definition of motherhood
has not only placed women in charge of children, but it has also barred them from
other roles. Employers consistently refused to hire women with pre-school age chil-
dren but did not use the same hiring policy for males. The Supreme Court finally
declared such action illegal unless the employer could demonstrate that the existence
of conflicting family obligations is a bona fide occupational qualification. Phillips v.
Martin-Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971). For equal protection purposes, however,
distinctions based upon pregnancy are not per se sex discrimination. Gelduldig v.
1982]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
Of course, no culture has the option of shifting to men
the functions of pregnancy, childbirth, and breastfeeding; but
outside of these functions and absent directive socialization,
nothing inherent about women makes them better able to care
for children than males. To assign women to a social role
based on improbably generalized characteristics is particularly
onerous because that assignment is tied to discrimination
against them.
The allocation to a woman of those basic roles with which
her physical attributes initially connect her guarantees that
the culture will continue to have the child-bearing child care
function fulfilled. The function will be fulfilled, however, at
the cost of restricting women's other roles. To give women the
choice not to become mothers is to allow them to assert them-
selves against a system which discriminates against them. As
the Court in Eisenstadt struck at illegitimacy without dissolv-
ing the social system, in Roe it acknowledged that mother-
hood serves as a basis for discrimination against women with-
out dismantling the motherhood role. 108 The contraception
and abortion cases thus strike a close balance between wo-
men's right to personal autonomy and protection of the ex-
isting cultural role. Women's claims to personal privacy in the
abortion and contraception cases relate, not only to their
claims to be free from physical and emotional detriments
caused by unwanted pregnancy, but also to an additional, yet
unarticulated, claim that choice in matters of childbearing is
directly connected to discrimination against women. Under-
standing that connection gives added weight to the meaning
of detriment in Roe. The choice to have an abortion, like the
choice to practice contraception, is fundamental to women be-
cause their ability to bear children has been used by a male-
dominated system to subordinate them. Even if the Court
were to explicitly recognize the connection between choices on
childbearing and women's secondary social status, it cannot
give women complete autonomy either by destroying illegiti-
macy or by creating a rule that permits women to control
childbearing without making a significant attack on the social
system of which it is a product. The choice rule, on the other
Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
108. Indeed, affording women the choice not to become mothers offers protec-
tion for the role's traditional content. That is, if women need not become mothers
except upon their own terms, pressure to change the mother's role is lessened.
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hand, permits the Court to recognize the detriment without
invading the traditional social role of motherhood in any way.
As in Eisenstadt which, left the Court free to continue to rec-
ognize differences between legitimate and illegitimate children
in other contexts, so Roe leaves the Court free to recognize
state interests in protection of the traditional familial rela-
tionships in other areas. 109 Any application of the privacy
claims originating in Eisenstadt and Roe to surrogate gesta-
tion contracts must take account of this developmental pat-
tern of the Court's decisions. Those decisions have moved to-
ward significant autonomy for women through protection of
their choice not to bear children.
D. Surrogate Gestation and Privacy Rights.
Parties to surrogate gestation contracts have asserted
that their rights are constitutionally protected because surro-
gate gestation, like contraception and abortion, involves
procreational choice. Whether surrogate gestation does, in
fact, fall within a protected zone of privacy may depend upon
the similarities of the choices involved in the contract to the
choices involved in other protected procreational situations.
Even if the surrogate gestation choice does lie within a pro-
tected zone, procreational rights have never been declared ab-
solute.110 Thus, a state might retain some interest in regulat-
ing surrogate gestation contracts even if the right to enter into
such contracts could not be entirely barred.
An initial argument against constitutional protection for
surrogate gestation arises from the evolution of the contracep-
tion and abortion cases.11 The choice involved in those cases
can be characterized as fundamental because it enables wo-
men to avoid the effects of past, unfair treatment. 1 2 In con-
trast, none of the participants in a surrogate gestation con-
tract asserts an exactly similar right. The biological father of
the child cannot claim a right analogous to that protected by
Eisenstadt or Roe.113 Fathers have never been the object of a
109. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Moore v. City of East Cleve-
land, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
110. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 162-65.
111. See text accompanying notes 73-109 supra.
112. See text accompanying notes 107-09 supra.
113. The biological father's constitutional claim is more likely to be respected if
it can be grounded in the relationship with the potential child rather than upon the
19821
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discrimination comparable to illegitimacy11 nor have they
suffered from subordination connected with their paternal
role. Indeed, the assertion of a right to enter into a surrogate
gestation contract reinvents something of the same system
disestablished by the Court's abortion cases. Male rights to
legitimate children born outside of the marriage or to refuse
to do so are inextricably intertwined with a detriment to wo-
men. When a man enters into a surrogate gestation contract,
he reasserts principles similar to those supporting illegitimacy.
Not only does he claim a child biologically connected to him,
but he claims a right to control the legitimation of that rela-
tionship through the application of a free market theory.1 5
The surrogate gestator's rights come closer to fitting a
broad characterization of the rights protected by Eisenstadt
and Roe. If Eisenstadt and Roe are viewed as protecting any
choice,"' then the surrogate's choice might be protected even
though it does not arise from the theoretical basis supporting
women's rights in those cases. On the other hand, a narrower
reading of women's contraception and abortion rights would
produce a different result. If the purpose of the contraception
and abortion cases is closely tied to eradicating the effects of a
system that uses women's childbearing ability to unfairly
subordinate them, then the surrogate gestator's choice would
not deserve protection. The surrogate gestator is not attempt-
ing to avoid the detriment of pregnancy or the stigma of an
illegitimate child. Even in a contract in which she is not paid,
her choice allows her more than a right to choose a traditional
social role. Thus, the polarity of the choices involved might
lead one to conclude that surrogate gestation is not constitu-
tionally protected because it is radically opposed to the choice
afforded in the contraception and abortion decisions.
father's relation to the surrogate. The father's relation to the surrogate is not an inti-
mate physical relationship. Nor is it an emotional attachment that is likely to flourish
into a protectable relationship. See Karst, supra note 23. Indeed, the father-surrogate
relationship may look too much like unmarried cohabitation to receive significant
protection. See Hollenbaugh v. Carnegie Free Library, 436 F. Supp. 1328 (W.D. Pa.
1977), afl'd mem., 578 F.2d 1374 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1052 (1978).
114. See text accompanying notes 91-99 supra.
115. See F. ENGELS, supra note 84; J. GALBRAITH, ECONOMICS AND THE PUBLIC
PURPOSE 31 (1973).
116. Cf. Braverman, Flannery, Lipsett & Weisman, Test Tube Babies: Legal
Issues Raised by In Vitro Fertilization, 67 GEo. L.J. 1295 (1979) (suggesting that
protection of choice may not be extended to some methods of artificial conception).
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A position, however, that would deny all constitutional
protection to surrogate gestation because of the historical con-
tent of the choice involved is too extreme. First, such a posi-
tion ignores the Court's repeated emphasis that it protects a
decision.1 17 Characterization of a right as a decisional one im-
plies that protection is not connected to the decision's con-
tent. A choice to decide only for an option deemed fit by the
Court or any other group is hardly a real choice. Second, to
protect the abortion choice but not the surrogate gestation
choice runs afoul of the abjuration that the due process clause
should not be a vehicle for preferring new social values over
old ones.118 As long as the crux of the Roe decision is the pro-
tection of choice, such preferences are avoided. While admit-
ting the reality of a social system in which the mother-child
relationship leads to discrimination against women, the choice
principle is neutral because it selects neither the values inher-
ent in that system nor those associated with any alterna-
tive. " At the same time that the principle of choice recog-
nizes individual women's claims that motherhood would be a
detriment to them, it neither inhibits entrance into the moth-
erhood role nor attempts to define that role's content. ' Com-
parison of the choice involved in contraception or abortion
117. Carey v. Population Serv. Int., 431 U.S. at 685.
118. This aspect of Roe has caused the most cogent criticism of the case. See
Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment of Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920
(1973).
119. The choice principle has a way of bringing those of us who support the
right to an abortion full circle. To continue to insist upon the abortion choice but
deny the surrogate gestator's choice, one must show why abortion should be protected
while surrogate gestation should not. The thrust of this article is that the difference
between the result of the two choices is crucial for women as a class. The ability to
choose an abortion means that women can control their biological capacity to bear
children. If they control that capacity, it cannot be used to punish or to subordinate
them. Surrogate gestation, on the other hand, surrenders that control for a contrac-
tual promise. The temptation in the face of such a disturbing choice is to cry wolf
once again. Women ought to be cautious about asking the Court to protect them from
poor choices. In the past that has led to decisions that isolated them in their domestic
roles. See Mueller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130
(1872).
120. The questions involved in Roe and in the instance of surrogate gestation
are more than those of whether being a mother is good or bad. At bottom, the issue is
whether being female can continue to be a ground for restriction and differentiation.
Because the primary basis for such restriction and differentiation has been women's
childbearing capacity, rules vesting control over that capacity are a place to begin.
When women control the differentiating factor, they have some protection from
senseless differentiation.
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and surrogate gestation need not necessarily result in a posi-
tion denying surrogate gestation all constitutional protection.
The comparison has value, however, because it demonstrates
the importance of state neutrality in procreational matters.
V. STATE REGULATION OF SURROGATE GESTATION
State neutrality toward surrogate gestation contracts re-
quires more than the absence of legislation prohibiting such
contracts. In the context of abortion, the state can neither
prohibit certain abortions nor require them. The state may
not support the values of those women who believe that the
mother-child relationship is a detriment, nor may it support
the values of those women who believe it is sacrosanct. The
same neutral attitude should be maintained toward surrogate
gestation: the state should neither prohibit surrogate gestation
contracts, nor enforce such contracts. If the state enforces sur-
rogate gestation contracts through any rule similar in result to
specific performance, it is in the position of supporting the
propriety of a particular social role for women. Such support
is impermissible because it is the enforcement of a value judg-
ment that women's procreative ability may be properly used
to satisfy the needs of other persons."' Likewise, if the state
forbids surrogate gestation contracts, it places itself in the po-
sition of denying women the right to choose a social role. In
either case, the neutral choice rule is violated.
When a state is faced with a surrogate gestator unwilling
to transfer the child to the biological father and his spouse, it
should treat the child's biological parents exactly as other bio-
logical parents are treated. It should assume that the parent-
child relationship is of fundamental importance"' and that a
compelling state interest is necessary to terminate that rela-
tionship with regard to either parent."28 Thus, as between the
two parents, the state should initially remain neutral by pro-
121. To deny that the Court makes value judgments even in this sensititve area
would be foolish. What the Court seems to have done is to subordinate the values on
either side to the higher value of choice.
122. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 505 (1977); May v. Ander-
son, 345 U.S. 528, 534 (1953); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944);
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390, 399 (1923).




tecting both the biological parents' relationship to the child.
Surrogate gestators should not, as a class, have fewer con-
stitutional rights than other women. If the biological mother
determines that she does not wish to carry the pregnancy to
term, she must be permitted that unilateral decision. 124 If the
biological father cannot interpose his wishes upon that deci-
sion by his own spouse, he should not be able to prohibit the
decision by the surrogate. If the biological mother does carry
the pregnancy to term but refuses to surrender the child
under the contract, the breach should be treated as a custody
dispute. The issues of custody and visitation should be de-
cided under the same standards generally applicable to child
custody cases. "5 In most states the standard will be the best
interest of the child. Of course, difficult questions will arise in
those cases in which the biological father and his spouse are
using a surrogate gestation contract to acquire their first child
from a surrogate who has other children. In those instances, a
court will have some evidence of the surrogate's interaction
with her other children but will have no objective measure of
the biological father's parental capabilities. Expanding evi-
dence of pre-birth bonding between mothers and children
may point toward some preference for maternal custody in
this unique situation. 12 Courts, however, should be careful to
confine the basis for their custody decisions to psychological
evidence generally used in custody cases. They should not use
the unique circumstances of the child's birth as a weapon
against either parent.
A state's refusal to enforce the contract against the surro-
gate must be parallelled by its refusal to enforce the contract
for her. Thus, she should not be entitled to use the courts to
collect any contractual fee. That resolution does not demand
abrogation of the child's support rights.2 7 If the biological fa-
ther refuses to take the child, the surrogate gestator should be
able to enforce a support claim against him on the child's be-
half. In most states the presumption that a child conceived
during a marriage is the child of a surrogate's spouse is a re-
buttable presumption.2 8 The surrogate, acting on behalf of
124. Planned Parenthood of Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
125. See supra notes 45-48.
126. Cf. Rossi, A Biosocial Perspective on Parenting, 106 DAEDALUS 1 (1977).
127. See supra note 49.
128. See supra note 11.
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the child, should be given an opportunity to establish the fac-
tual parentage of the child involved in order to enforce the
support claim.
State neutrality with regard to abortion decisions is not
absolute. After the first trimester of pregnancy, the state's
right to regulate abortion becomes more substantial.12' The
ability to impose additional regulations is based upon the
state interest in maternal health and potential human life.180
Similarly, absolute state neutrality should not be required in
surrogate gestation. Such contracts carried to termination
produce an existing child whose interests must be taken into
account. A requirement of initial neutrality toward the choice
to enter into the contract does not prohibit all state regula-
tion, particularly if the regulations are carefully drawn to pro-
tect the interests of the children involved.'
A number of states currently prohibit the sale of chil-
dren. s In one state, a court confronted with a surrogate ges-
tation contract analogized the contract to a sale because of
concern over commercializing the birth of children.' A
state's interest in preventing the actual sale of children is an
important one. Nevertheless, the transfer of a child in which
the recipient parent has a biological relationship to the child
should not be regarded as a sale. The reason for prohibiting
the sale of children is a judgment that the amount of money
unrelated individuals can pay bears no relationship to their
ability to fulfill children's emotional and psychological needs.
Transfers to related persons or between them, however, are
treated differently. 13 In those cases, the biological relation-
ship is assumed to protect the child's best interest. The state's
interest in protection of the child can be satisfied by prevent-
ing its transfer under the contract to anyone other than the
129. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).
130. Id.
131. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (not all state regulation impinging
upon rights of fundamental importance is barred).
132. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.212(1)(b) (West Supp. 1981); IDAHO CODE §
18-1511 (Supp. 1981); KAN. REV. STAT. § 65-509 (1919); N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. §
9:3-54 (West Supp. 1981).
133. Doe v. Kelley, 6 FAM. L. REP. 3011 (BNA) (Feb. 19, 1980).
134. The biological relationship between the child and one parent is a reason
for the lack of state interference in step-parent adoptions. See supra note 29. Al-
though custody of children on divorce is occasionally awarded to nonparents, parents




biological father and his spouse.1"
In the abortion cases, the Court also identified a separate
state interest in the protection of the mother. "' Whether a
state might use that interest to enact a blanket prohibition
upon the payment of a fee to surrogates is a difficult question.
Both the abortion funding cases8 7 and the Court's decisions
on the right to marry " indicate the justices' ability, on occa-
sion, to separate a fundamental right and the monetary con-
siderations related to its exercise. Not all state rules that im-
pose a financial barrier to the exercise of a fundamental right
are prohibited. " 9 For that reason a state might argue that for-
bidding payment to a surrogate gestator continues to leave the
surrogate free to exercise her choice. Such an argument, how-
ever, should be rejected. A state has an interest in the protec-
tion of the maternal health of women engaging in surrogate
gestation contracts. Forbidding the payment of a fee to those
women has no effect upon their maternal health. Whether a
surrogate mother has a healthy pregnancy depends upon her
health prior to pregnancy and upon the kind of health care
she receives during pregnancy. Thus, the reason for prohibi-
tion of fee payment appears to be to burden the choice to
enter the contract. If the state's reason for prohibiting fees is
to discourage entrance into the contract, such prohibitions
should not be permitted because they allow the state to make
a judgment regarding a choice of procreation.
The state's concern for maternal and fetal health" also
permits it to regulate the facilitators of surrogate gestation
contracts. A state might adopt licensing requirements for fa-
cilitating agencies similar to those used under adoption stat-
utes.' Licensing requirements could properly be used to en-
sure adequate medical protection for surrogates and children.
In a number of states adoption agencies are barred from
135. The fact of the transfer could give the state the right to scrutinize the
proposed adoption in order to determine whether the child was in need of state pro-
tection. To prevent a transfer agreed upon by all parties the state should have to
demonstrate that the transfer would result in harm to the child involved.
136. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).
137. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977).
138. Compare Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) with Califano v. Jobst,
434 U.S. 47 (1977).
139. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
140. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
141. See supra note 31.
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charging fees for the placement of children,1 42 a prohibition
intended to prevent the sale of children. Surrogate gestation
facilitators, however, are not involved with traditional adop-
tion. The biological connection between the child and the con-
tract participants is some insurance that surrogate gestation
will not replace "blackmarket adoption." Thus, prohibition of
reasonable fees for facilitators is inappropriate.' 48
VI. CONCLUSION
Surrogate gestation is a new method of providing children
to people who either are not able to have children by the
traditional method or are unwilling to assume the burdens of
pregnancy. The novelty of surrogate gestation contracts
presents the courts with many issues that will need to be re-
solved in the future.
The laws which exist today are inadequate to handle the
unique problem of surrogate gestation contracts. Before any
legislation can be enacted, however, a determination must be
made whether, in fact, the state has a right to regulate, or
even prohibit, surrogate gestation. The determination of that
right lies in the interpretation of the Supreme Court's past
decisions regarding the right to procreational choice.
Initially, the Court held the view that procreation was a
matter to be controlled by men, since men had a recognized
interest in controlling their family wealth. As the social role of
women changed, the Court recognized the possible detriment
that pregnancy causes women. Thus, the Court extended the
right to procreational choice to women. Surrogate gestation
participants, however, do not present the same arguments for
a constitutionally protected right to privacy. The contracts
cannot be viewed as a remedy for past discrimination or the
removal of a detriment. If the past Supreme Court decisions
are viewed as protecting any choice with regard to procrea-
tion, then surrogate gestation contracts should be protected
from state prohibition.
While state prohibition of such contracts may be denied,
state regulation probably will not. Just as the state may regu-
142. See supra note 28.
143. Just as adoption agencies are restricted to fees related to actual expenses
involved, facilitators of surrogate gestation contracts might have their own fees
restricted.
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late abortion under certain circumstances, so should the state
have the right to regulate surrogate gestation under similar
circumstances. The state should remain neutral in its treat-
ment of the actual surrogate gestation contracts, but should
be allowed to intervene under the compelling state interest of
protecting the best interest of the child which results from
such a contract.

